Avian influenza
Meta data
Abstract
Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non‐wild bird pathways were identified having a non‐negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV‐infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.
This publication is linked to the following EFSA Journal article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.5018/full
This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1282/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1283/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1284/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1285/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1286/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1287/full
See also
- Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017
- Risk factors of primary introduction of highly pathogenic and low pathogenic avian influenza virus …
- Narrative overview on wild bird migration in the context of highly pathogenic avian influenza incur…
- Report about HPAI introduction into Europe, HPAI detection in wild birds and HPAI spread between Eu…
- Data analysis and predictive modelling of HPAI H5 and H7 outbreaks in the EU 2005-2015
- LPAI detection in wild birds and LPAI spread between European holdings in the period 2005-2015
- Mechanisms and risk factors for mutation from low to highly pathogenic avian influenza virus