



Problem formulation for the environmental risk assessment of gene drive modified *Drosophila suzukii*

Jörg Romeis, Jana Collatz


Agroscope, Zurich, Switzerland

Debora CM Glandorf

*National Institute of Health and the Environment
The Netherlands*

Michael B Bonsall


Oxford University, UK





Drosophila suzukii



Global distribution (May 2015)





Drosophila suzukii

- Spotted wing *Drosophila*
- Serrated ovipositor
- Able to infest ripening, undamaged fruits
- Oviposits in stone fruit, berries, grapes, wild fruit





Drosophila – ecosystem functions

- The genus *Drosophila* (Diptera: Drosophilidae) contains about 2'000 known species
- They fulfill different functions
 - Herbivory: *D. suzukii*, *D. subpulchrella*
 - Decomposition: *D. melanogaster*, *D. suboscuro*
 - Pollination: *D. hydei*, *D. repleta*
 - Predation



Drosophila – ecosystem functions

- Important food-web component


Predators



Parasitoids



Drosophila
species




Crop/ non-crop
plants, senescent
plant material





Gene drives in *D. suzukii*




Case study

***Drosophila suzukii* with a suppression drive
to be released in invaded areas**



Development of a GD organism




Phased testing pathway (WHO 2014)

FOUNDATION
National Institutes of Health

World Health
Organization

TDR For research on
diseases of poverty
UNICEF • UNICOP • World Bank • WHO




Adopted and expanded (NASEM 2016)

The National Academies of
SCIENCES • ENGINEERING • MEDICINE




Development of a GD organism




Phase 0. Research preparation

- Target product profile
- Confinement/ containment strategies
- Develop mitigation strategies
- Engagement with policy makers






Development of a GD organism




Phase 1. Lab-based research

- Optimize drive system
 - Efficacy
 - Stability
 - Off-target effects
- Fitness/ competitiveness
- Marking of drive organisms
- Study bioconfinement and strategies to mitigate harm by unintended releases






Development of a GD organism



Phase 2.


Field-based research, restricted dispersal/ persistence (e.g., cages, islands)

- Validate efficacy
- Population-level effects
- Fitness/ competitiveness
- Impact on non-targets






Development of a GD organism




Phase 3. Staged environmental release

- Efficacy
- Environmental harm






Development of a GD organism



Phase 4. Post-release surveillance

- Measure impact






Development of a GD organism

Conditions to be met before a **GM insect with gene drive** is tested under less contained conditions

- Trait is stably expressed
- No unintended effects of the transformation detected
- GM insects are as fit/ competitive as wildtypes
- Gene drive works as intended under confined/ controlled conditions
-



Gene drives in *D. sukuzii* - Status



- Embryonic lethal transgenes have been introduced into *D. melanogaster* (Horn & Wimmer 2003)
- Genome editing of *D. sukuzii* is feasible – CRISPR-Cas9 system developed for *D. melanogaster* also functions in *D. sukuzii* (Li & Scott 2016; Schetelig et al. 2018)
- A *Medea*-drive system has successfully been engineered into *D. sukuzii* (Buchman et al. 2018)
 - inheritance rates of up to 100% observed
 - High release frequency required
 - rather large fitness costs leading to self-limiting dynamics of the system



Problem formulation

What do we not want to see harmed? What must be protected?

➡ *Protection goals*




Protection goals

Policy protection goal: BIODIVERSITY


Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2015)

(conducted under the auspices of the United Nations)




Regulating services

- Biological control of arthropod pests
- Pollination



Cultural services

- Protected butterflies



Supporting services

- Nutrient cycling, decomposition





Problem formulation

What do we not want to see harmed? What must be protected?

➡ *Protection goals*

Can we envision a way in which they could be harmed?

➡ *Pathway to harm*

How can we assess whether they are likely to be harmed?

➡ *Development of risk hypotheses and a plan to test them*



Plausible pathways to harm I



Release of GD *D. suzukii*

Biological control function is disrupted



Plausible pathways to harm I




Release of GD *D. suzukii*



Populations of *D. suzukii* are eradicated



Lack of hosts/ prey




Populations of natural enemies are reduced



Biological control function is disrupted



Plausible pathways to harm I





Plausible pathways to harm I



Evidence available

- In invaded areas, *D. suzukii* is unlikely to become a key component in the food web
 - eradication has negligible indirect food-web effects
- In area of origin, highly specialized natural enemies occur that could be adversely affected
(*Nomano et al. 2017; Girod et al. 2018a,b*)



Plausible pathways to harm II



Release of GD *D. suzukii*



Hybridization with other native *Drosophila* spp.

Biological control function is disrupted



Plausible pathways to harm II



Release of GD *D. suzukii*



Hybridization with other native *Drosophila* spp.



Gene drives is functional



Populations of *Drosophila* are eradicated



Lack of hosts/ prey



Populations of natural enemies are reduced



Biological control function is disrupted



Plausible pathways to harm II




Evidence available

- Hybridization among *Drosophila* has been reported for closely related species, i.e. species within one species group – but it is a rare event (*Bock 1984; Garrigan et al. 2012*)
- Transfer of transposable elements has been reported
 - Example: P-element invaded *D. melanogaster* genome from *D. willistoni* (*Daniel et al. 1990*)



Non-plausible pathways to harm I



Evidence available:

- No *Drosophila* species known from the *D. sukuzii* habitat that provides bio-control function



Non-plausible pathways to harm II



Release of GD *D. suzukii*



Horizontal gene transfer to
unrelated organism



Gene drive is functional



Species contributes to biological
control



Populations decline



Biological control function is disrupted

Evidence available:

- Probability of HGT between *D. suzukii* and other unrelated organisms to occur is extremely unlikely under natural conditions
- Unlikely that drive is functional

Experience with insect control technologies

Insect control technologies are available that require the release (and establishment) of living organisms

- **Classical biological control**

- Release of natural enemies from area of origin of the invasive pest



- **Sterile Insect Technique (SIT)**

- Release of mass-produced sterilized insects



- **Incompatible Insect Technique (IIT)**

- Release of insects carrying incompatible *Wolbachia* strains



- **Genetically modified insects**

- Insects contain self-limiting traits





Conclusions

- Experience exists with pest control technologies that require the release/ establishment of living organisms
- Existing risk assessment frameworks can be used to assess GD organisms
- We see no novel risks with the use of GD organisms, but effects might be more severe
- The context in which the GD organisms are used is important
 - ERA needs to consider benefits (as for classical biocontrol)
 - What constitutes harm needs to be defined



Thank you for your attention



joerg.romeis@agroscope.admin.ch